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by

Joshua D. Angrist
Apr· i 1

i '7'82 Dber' 1 in Co 1 1 ege

A. Intr'oduction
The most disturbing
labor

economics

(1)

and difficuit empirical problems of

revolve

around

the

absence

of

crucial

information; the wage an unemployed person would receive if he or
she

were worKing. The most controversial pol icy problem of labor

economIcs
problem?

is

embodied in the question; when is

unemployment

The goal of this paper is to propose a methodology

a
for

studying the first problem that sheds some light on the second.
1"10':. t

ee cln am i·:. t ';:. a.gr ee t h a. t ':some 1 eve 1 of un emp 1 oymen t

necessary
m.;:'.r·l< e t .
be

and

socially

to

efficient

Some
e::< pee

of

A
the

of

case

can

human

might
ted

Surely
not

B.

1.:r.bor·

say

.!h en

[.<·1h <:t. t

5%

a.bou t

unemployment

incentives
the progressive tax

such a level of

to

a

worK

structure.

unemployment

to

i';:.

be

the government interferes in the labor market

i,.·•

the

resources.

unempl

that

of

be made that at

by transfer payments and

raising

·:;'.r·e

2% and an important part

al location

unemployment?

eroded

the

of

'E.

This necessary level of unemployment is often thought to

a.r· ou n d

por·tion

efficent characteristic

i

opportunity cost of working. And

10X

unemplyment?

some of these people are "involuntarily" unemployed. They
unempl

because they are looKing for better jobs
on unemployment compensation or some other sort of

t r· .;:., n;;;. fer'

income that it is not worth their while to taKe a
they

have

looKed

for worK, are

wi! 1 ing

to

worK

JOD.

at

(1) This paper would have been impossible
without the assistance
and patience of the Oberl in College Economics Department and the
staff of the Oberl in Col lege Computing Center.

prevail ing wages and are capable of productive activity. How does
one

find

they

exist at all? Sociologists might asK them but in

we are all

information
1;.,1or·k.

decision
rules

economics

behaviorists.

Something

to

th.:..t

out who these people are or prove to the sceptic

we

do

have

an idea

about

the

i·::.

ty'pe

of

relevant ot the individual's decision to work or not
In fact, we can precisely formulate

rules

and then asK how well our

some

theoretical
dec i ';;i on

t h eor' e tic a.l

explain the behavior that we actually observe in the labor

market. Any economic characterization of an individual's decision
maKing

process

taKes into account the costs and benefits of

an

action taKen, where these costs and benefits are evalDated at the
The

relevant marginal benefit in the case of

decision is clearly the hourly wage. Of course, this ~ay not be a
single

Known

number.

disrtibution

WorKers may have expectations

readers

·:;.ubs.t i tu t i on,

contracts model wherein worKers
fQr

may

a

hi

U

er' e':;. tin g

s @1)" Job security

find a recent examination of it in Ashenf@lter

contracts
here

model.
1S

Al thou

these

in

the

provides an

incorporat@d

in t

er hourly wage. Lucas and

A1ton,ji
impl icit

AnQther'

to the simple notion of a single hourly wage is the

rnodi fica. t i on

return

the

of wage rates over time as in the literature on Job
in t er' t empc,r' .:'.1

imp1 icit

about

example

approach@s

not because they are

of
are

and
·;:'.n

not

thc~ught

withQut merit. In fact they are very appeal ing in that they treat
information

as any other good; one which eCQnQmic agents

behave

purposefully
1'7'::::(1

and

p , 7 17) ,

determi

n·;:..

rationally in collection and usage

In

t i on

,::.ur'

model

is

i t

of

the

the asKIng

counterpart of the offered wage;

labor

wage

(McCullum,

marKet

which

and

wage

represents

the offered wage

IS

the marginal

benefi.t

from

marginal

cost, the opportunity cost of worKing as measured by the

',,/a.lue

worKing another hour while the asKing wage

leisur'e

of

opportunities
!.i.Jc;.r·t< i n 9

will

income,

o t her'

I.J,)()r'1<

and consumption pressure. The opportunity cost
·::'.n .:;..1 B.I;;tou ':;:.

i -;:.

be

time,

the

i~

to Gr' on .:=t.U ....;:.

(

1973 : .

"\.JB.l

t ime"

u e clf

used to develop an econometric specification

for

of
i:I.nd
what

be cal led the participation wage in the rest of the analysis

F'r·es.en ted her'e,
In this paper we would liKe to asK what sorts of

decision

rules

will

p.::..i d.

If we understand something about the way the observed wage

di

':E. t

r' i

the

best explain the observed distribution of wage

bu 1: i on

wages

could

is

rates

drawn from the population of wage rates;

paid to those who worK and the wages

expect if they were worKing,

unemployed

then we may be in a

we

maximizing

decision maKers who, in equil ibrium, have chosen

worK

i ':;:.

un emp 1 e')-''rnen t

,'e-;:.ult

the

because the costs (the participation wage)

be Ii e fit ';:. ( the

Ii·'! a.

get he>.·' c 0 u 1 d e)( pee t f

r' om

1;•.1 0

P

f< i n 9 :;.

of

position

particular

to

asK:

the

utilit:/

exceed
.::' I J':

i

Ii

not
the
f."•. c t

this is the true nature of unemployment then clearly the observed
wage

distribution cannot be an unbiased sample of the true

distribution
" s.pee i .8.1 "

because

the people for whom we observe a wage

wage
are

in the sense that they have an equilibrium position in

P"'.ge

the

labor

market

which is a consequence

of

their

4

particular

expected return to work and opportunity cost of working. The bias
in

the observed wage distribution is a by-product of the

nature

of

the equilibrium which generated that distribution. Of

course

it

i~

also possible that the unemployed (and correspondingly the

employed)
may

may not be in utility maximizing equilibrium, yet they

still

be special in some sense, that is, the observed

distribution
econometric
if

may

suffer from sample

still

selection.

wage
the

In

work to follow in this paper it will be assumed that

the unemployed are not "voluntarily" out of work in the sense

that

they are in the equilibrium discussed above then they are a

random
this

subs..;;..mpl e elf the popul ation in the l"'.bor· fc.rce. N..,.tur..,.11::.'
is a highly unrealistic assumption and even within narrowly

def i ned demc.gr· a.ph i c gr ou p';:' the obs·erved 1.I·.Ia,ge da. t a.
some

sample

distribution
unemployed
the

selection

bias, i.e., not reflect

for

demographic

that

group,

s· till h ..",,-Ie

1.1•.1 i l l

the

even

wage

tru~

if

the

all

within that group are not in equilibrium. However, if

unemployed

are

not in equilibrium in the sense

that

would

be better off by working ( where better off means that the

wage

they could expect to receive exceeds the wage at which they

would

be

willing

selection
cannot
observe
expec ted

rule

be

the

offer positive hours)

then

which determines the observed wage

the

sample

distribution

the one that says: " the people whose wage

we

don/t

are those whose participation wage is in excess of their
I;.Jage

invol'Jntary'
of

to

II

Therefore,

IJnemplc.~,..ment

mc.de 1

to

for

the

pr'esence

tNe I.Alil] cc.mpare the predictive

of equilibrium voluntary

unemployment

of

a.bility
with

the

simplest

alternative;

uncondi t i clna 1
r' e 1 at i'v'e

regression
with

with

a

constant

of un emp 1 I::.ymen t. Th i s sor t of c ompar i son

similar
analysis

the

to

the standard

F-test

in

i,;:,

multivariate

where a detailed specification is

compared

the naive estimator, the mean of the dependent variable, to

determine

the

Unfortunately
comparable
sections
the

occurs

probability p, the best estimator of which is

f r' equ en c : ,. '

conceptually

unemployment

legitimacy
the

to

of

statistics

the

detailed

the
of

specification.

the process are

not

F-test procedure as will be shown

of the paper.

at
in

all
later

The natural choice for the model wherein

unemployed are in utility maximizing equilibri.um is Nelson's

( 1 '7'74)

overcome

Censored
the

Regression

Model,

designed

specifically

problem of sample selection bias that arises

to
when

observed data is not an unbiased sample of the population for the
reasons discussed here (2).
The Cens·clr·ed Regressi on Model pr'oposed by Nel-:.cln i -:. s.hown bel ow ~
v.~e ( i )

= 8 lX 1 + u ( i )

Wp(i) = 82X2 + vei)
W:

i)

Wei)

= Wee i)

=

0 otherwise.

iNhere
(2)This model can be 'seen to be similar to another model of
tr·unca.tion, na.mely the Tobit mCldel (Tobin,
1'7'58). The ma.in
difference between this model and the Tobit model is that Tobit
takes the point of truncation as known and fixed whereas in
the
Censored Regression Model the point of truncation is a stochastic
variable to be estimated.

Po9.ge

and X2 ar'e vect,;,r's of personal cho9.r·o9.cteristics, lAje(i)

X1

is

6

the

iTH agent's expected wage, i.e., the wage he or she would receive
if

v,lc,rl<ing,

are

v( i)

agent

t·;:.

the iTH agent's po9.r·ticipation wage,

classical error terms, Wei) is the wage

i . e. ,

observed

for

and 81 and 82 are vectors of parameters to be estimated.

i

Gronau

Wp(i)

(1974) was the first to point out that if this is the way

ob':;er'ved

wages, vHi), ar'e generated then Or·dina.r·y Leo9.'::.t

E;quar'es

estimation of the first equation above,
W(i)

be

lAd 1 1

= We(i) = 81)<1 + u(i)

biased. Heckman (1976 and 1979) discusses

selection

bias

equation

and

as

a specification error in the

shows (1979)

in particular that the

error

term, conditional on the sample selection rule.

inappropriate
important

for

since

ordinary

either

of

the

least
wage

squares
equations

of

the

Following

est ima te the CRM ·as a ,::.ystem b::l the

I ikelihood

maximum

Wp

case is the failure to include the mean

will

wage

specification

in

we

sample

expected

error

Nelson

this

this

method
is

elf

clearly

shown.

The

thing to nc.tice about thi·s model is tha.t, once II-le

and

are properly and precisely defined, as they hopefully will be

in the next section of this paper, then the CRM is the most basic
and

obvious

data

in

diagram

the
1

decision

on

neo-classical
the

following

theory of
page

labor

wherein

observed

supply.
the

wage

Consider

partcicpation

is illustrated for the standard case of a linear budget

con,::.tr·aint
income

specification for the generation of

in the incclme-leisur'e plo9.ne. Her'e Qo is leisure, Y i-:;·

a.nd T i,::. the total

time o9.vo9.i lo9.ble fc,r a.l1clco9.tion

between

DLJ7G-l<.flM J._-----

y

.5' ft.. : -"y L
tJ

oS

10 j'J

e ;' - w/
\

~~\

(0)1"1) - - --

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

(7;0)

kI, :::

rCA/' -f It:. j>
Jo-rled ~/"/le.
,"", ('. I' e
1 r-I,. e
"'.0(

e

J

GI. oSl '",

c:;(

~ '"0'"

y

~

=

/70/1

~

L.

ro'l-e;...t

.:It." CJ/'
,I:'"

c..O M

/~
e,

1 e...)

,L4.e Let.l.Q/'
tA/ Go4..1 e.- /' oA.. f e .

,IS

G:)o::' Le/JtAf'e
T .::. -1-/ """ !..

11

t-J ~

CoO"""

e

&4./

/~fIl\"

j e" c.)'

$"'1'/'7

CA..

C:;urve

-I-

Ft.~.,~e

income

and

leisure. Then,

if M is the amount of

non-labor

7

and

transfer income, we see the budget constraint to be:

t·" +

I.<~(T-G!o)

= . .(.

At wage rate Wi we find indifference curve Ul tangent at point A,
where

zero hours of work are offered and T hours of leisure

are

consumed. Since the marginal rate of substitution equals the wage
rate
the

Wi

such a tangency then W1 must be the value of time

~t

participation

nece~ssary

to

equilibrium
higher
whete

wage.

induce

Thus,

·.I-8.ge

gr' e.:;.. t er'

1...

point·;:;

of

are seen at points Band C, each corresponding to

positive

hours

inc ome

are offered since W3 ) W2 ) W1.

t"1 i,;:, .?qu .9.1

to

Z

er' 0

as

a

c c.n ':;;. t r' .:;., in t

fairly general representation of
in

is

a

involuntary

difficult
observed

a

to
wage

a model for the

I,o.)a.,;:e

linear

unemployment. Clearly it

choose

i. f

t con-:::.tr·.;:..i n t

the neo-classical model where markets

no

E'·./en

the pa.r· tic i p.:;.. t i on

simply zero and we may continue to think of the bu

there

i·::.

wage rate and generatin9 points on the labor supply curve

non-1 a.bor·

above

~'·ll

than

Addition.;..]

participation.

or

bu

clear

generation

.:;..nd
rnor' e

a_

i -:;

t

of

the

distribution under the hypothesis of
Certa.inl:.·' in'v'olunt .... r·;,1 unemplo>,'ment c-8.r·r· i e';:· (-,·.Iith it

the

notion

constraint
con-str-.:3.int.
constraint
have

chosen

unemployment
probabil ity

of some additional constraint other than the
and
In

any

complete specification must

bu

describe

this paper we will avoid the issue of

what

t

t hi,;:,

the

might be in our model of involuntary unemployment. We
an

th.8. t

alternative

pro ec 1 !,J ch?'::;'

"'-./01 un t B.r- ::.... "

and that is about all we can say about the constant
model of unemployment

j

with one important exception.

iJi

Or' din a.r· >..,

le·:;.. s t

expected

wage equation in our model of involuntary

since

we

Thus

:::;qu ':;'.r- e';:·

an a.ppr· opr' i

.:3. tee'::;,

t i mao t or

have assumed that there is no sample

for'

the

unemployment

selection

blas.

our only wage equation in the constant probability model

is

the first wage equation of the CRM above:
~·'l(i)

::::

iff i
W(i)

iTH

The

~'le(i)

=:

E:l>:~l

+ u(i)

is employed.
=:

0 otherwise.

agent is unemployed with constant probability

p,

a.nd

therefore this equation may be used to provide unbiased estimates
o f t h epa. r' ·:am e t e r' s
mc..:::lel
of

He

8 1.

1i 1 i

li..

c a. 1 1 t his

con ';. t ·9. n t

pro b a. b i i i t ::/

the OlS model; by OlS model we will mean the probabil ity p
the

unemployment,

above

wage

equation

and

a

liKelihood

equation to be derived later for predicting employment status for
a

particular sample. liKewise, by the CRM model we will mean the

system

of

implicit

equations
selection

the

previously introduced,
r-ule

determining

corresponding

employment

status

and

probability of unemployment for a given agent and a corresponding
1i

r.:e 1 i hCn:uj

ec~ua.

t i ::tn,

also to be derived later,

employment status for a particular sample.
To apply the notions of how one might describe the
of
di

un emp 1 o::. .men
':E.

t r' i

1:)1..1

the

h·.,Io

e>~r:iec

t

"t i on
r' ':'.c i

t

b.;:..·;.ed

on in i: o["m·:;., t ion a.bou t

the

both the CRM and OlS models will
a.l

groups, blacK and white. "A

the CRM model

nature

ob'E:.er· . . . . ed

be estimated
Pr-iori"

we

Il.Ja,ge
for
would

to do a better Job of predicting employment

than the OlS model for whites and we would expect the OlS
constant

probability model

to be better than the CRM for blacKs.

Page

The

results presented in the final section of this paper tend to

support
in

S:"".

a

that hypothesis. Unfortunately, the statistics
comparison

certainly

involved

def ined

such as this are not always well

and

are not fully developed in this paper. Only one sample

was used for estimation and clearly mul tiple sampling is in order
if one wishes to use this procedure to make any strong statements
about the nature of unemployment. Consequently the work presented
here

is

offered

unempl c.ymen t.
particular
as

a

as a methodological approach to the

study

of

Even readers sympa. thet i c to the conc 1 usi ons of the

estima.tiorl t.:) follc.f.;..1 should not interpr·et the reslJlts

conclusive statement about the nature of unemployment

for

the particular sample used in estimation.
Having

given

interpretation

and

supply.

involved

in

necessary

caveats

with

regard

to

we turn in the next section to the origins of the

participation
labor

the

expected wages in the neoclassical

Section
estimating

C

discusses some
the

OlS

a.nd

theory

of

of
CRt1

model s

usi ng

the

functional forms suggested by section 8. In section 0 the results
of

the various estimations and test procedures are presented and

evaluated
Section

in

light

of

goals

the or' i gin a. 1

and

propositions.

E suggests some conclusions about the procedure and some

directions

for

future

work.

Also included

are

a

number

of

appendices containing some earl ier empirical work on the OlS wage
equa t i ,:)n a.nd di·:.cu·:.si .:.ns c.f techn i cal

i

-:;.-:;·ues in est ima t i on.

B.

A f'lODEL OF LABOR SUPPL Y

In order to precisely identify the participation and expected wages it
is neceSsctry to aevelop a model of labor supply.

In general there are three

ways of dOLay turs.

For an excellent summary

Only one will be used bere.

of these tnr:8e :.jeneral approaches see Abbot and Ashenfelter

(976).

Our

approach SLaLts witu a direct utility function in income and leisure and
then uses the irLst-order conditions for constrained maximization to derive
labor sUPJ..'1.y.
reasons.

IU1S

approach was chosen for wilat are larqely intuitive

It seems to make sense that if one is qoing to discuss voluntary

and involuntary benavior one ought to begin with a description of
preferenCE;S.

In
(1954)

tn~s

Cdse our description of preferences is taken from stone's

Llil€dr Bxpenditure System.

It is the only expenditure system whose

correspoaurnq atllity function satisfies the theoretical restrictions of
adding-up, nomogellelty and. symmetry {D!::aton and !1uellbauer, 1980, p.6S).

It

also tae onLy Llnear expenditure system that can be derived from a
classicZL.. at.Ll-l.ty iUHctioH !Gold.berger,
direct

~

.v (.11=
. f'!! (Ql-Hl)
.-' ... /3/
~

f·, I

where

o"Ql, •••• ,Qn)

ii""{Hv,U1, •••• ,Bn)

Tois [uDetl.OD

lS

-

~-,.
/
.tn=!
'--

I

I

>.2=

The qeneral form of t.Ile LES

fUllction is,

utl~ity

d=

L967).

is the agent's consumption V'f:;ctor
and 6=(30,81, ••••• ,3n) dre pard1ll2t,:::r vectors.

usually transformed using natural logarithms into the

loq-linear torm
!J=LnV{..!)=

~BiLn(Qi-Hi).
I

When one of

t.~H3

COiUIllO

di ties, Qi is def i.ned to be leisure, sa y Qo, then the

above f uuc tion is referred to as an auqmen ted
utility .t'twct.l.on (Goldbel'qec, 1967).

.(f or:

lc:i sULe)

S to n e-Gear y

If all non-leisure commodities are

aqqreqated rntJ oue, called income, then the function

usuallY written

10

u= v (\2) = BoLn (Qo-Ho) + BLn (Q-H)
where Q

l.S

income dnd H .is a single valued pacameter.

This utility functl.on has a number of interesting properties that are
consistent

some intuitive notions about how preferences might be mapped

~itn

into a cardl.oa.1 ordering.

The fiest thing to notice is that the logar ithmic

terms give the function diminishing marginal utility.

In addition it is not

defined where UO<UO or Q<H because the arguments of the log terms would then
be negative.

The quantities Ho and H can therefore be interpreted as

n subsiste nce n

quantl. ties of leisure and income respecti vel y, an d they serve

as additl.ona.1

~aeameters

which make the functional form more flexible
•
.

Consider for example the pacameter H as a function of personal
characteristics,
H Ii)

=

Co+CZ (i)

where Z

l.S

+e (i)

a relevant set of its characteristics

Co,C are parameters and
e !i) l.S a classical error ter:m"'N~O,
Followi ny

GL

onii u

(B7 3)

0-} .

this approach will be incorpor ated in to our

estimation oi the participation wage.
In partl.cular our maximization procedure parallels that of Leuthold
(1968), expressLnq the budqet constraint in terms of income and time

allocation
For this

~dentl.ties

to De

and therefore bypassing issues of commodity demand.

a valid procedure it is necessary to assume that relative

prices are constant across the consumption bundles represented in our
sample.
Let the utility function be 3
U= V!Qo,Q;= ALn(Qo-Ho)+Bln(Q-H)
where
Uo=T-L T=total time available, L=labor supply
3The subscr1.pt

.I..

w1.11 be dropped for: clarity of notation.

11
Q=~L.M

d= non-labor income, W=the actual wage

A+b=l, Hu, Hare parameters 4 •
substituting tile constraints directly into the utility function qives
U= ALn[ {,r-L}

-Ho] + BLn[ (liLHi) -H 1

with the corresponding first order condition for maximization
aU/aL = -A/(T-.L-Ho)
Be-arrang~nq

+ (BW}/{WL+M-R)

= O.

dnd solving for L gives the labor supply fUDction
H{'I-Ho) -

L=

(A/W) {l'1-H).

Labor supply is seen to reach a maximum at BfT-Ho), i.e., B times the time

.

remaining after subtracting 'committed t leisure time.
Lonct~on

point as a

It varies up to this

of Wand l'1, increasing in Wand decreasinq in M.

The

participation wage is found by settinq L to zero:
.d (T-tio) - (A/W) (M-H) =0

and

tor tue participation wage Ip, givinq

solv~ng

vJp= (A eM-d) ]I( B (T-Ho) ].

Thus our true laDor supply fUnction is now discontinuous at Wp, the
participation

w~ge,

and is given by

B(1'-Ho) - (A/i) (!!:i-H)

L=

for: W>Wp

L= 0 ot.herwise.
Now i.t one

~s

not particularly interested in identifying the constants A,B

and T-80 then it

1S

possible to linearize the functional form bf the

participativn wage

wp=

[A (til-d) )/(E(T-Ho)

={A/f B (I-Ho)
where estimation
A/fBCT-Ho}

w~ll

1

]} (t1-H)

only allow identification of the coefficient

J as one number, say K.

4The restriction A+E=1 is not particularly important, only serving to make
the indifference curves associated with this utility function rectangular
hyperbolds, assymptotic to the two positive asymptotes, Ho and H.
The lower
A is relative to B the flatter the indifference curves vill be; reducing the
marginal rate ot sUDstitution.
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Allowing H to De a linear function of personal characteristics with a
classical error terill
H

=

Wp

= K( M - Co - CZ
= -KCo + KM - KCZ

Co

i-

CZ + e

then

- Eo

+

- e)
-

Ke

KM + EZ + u

where if
e-N (O,d)

is a classical error term then

u""'N (0, K9.-d)
Thus by

sacr~Iicinq

is also a classical erro.r ter ill.

identification of some parameters we have a linear form

for the partLcLpation wage that is a function of non-lanor income and
personal characteristics.
HavLoq derLved a simple linear form for the participation wage the next
task is to i usti!y the proposed characterizd tion of the expected wage..

The

procedure here follows closely that of Hall (1973) although the
interpretation is somewhat different.

Ball applies the concept of an

expected wage to estimation of labor supply as a solution to the missing
variables proDLem and a correction for measurement error, but does not
;ustify hLS imputatLon of fitted values to the unemployed mem.bers of his
samrle.

JusLLtLcation of this procedure requires some rather stronq

assumptions about the nature of unemployment that will be explored here.
For an econometrLc j ustif iea tion of the e xpec ted

ill aqe

as an iustrum ental

variables estimatur of the actual wage for the employed allowing unbiased
estimation of theLr labor supply see Appendix I
duplicated.

wh~re

Ball's proof is

Recall the labor supply equation

Ls= .d (T-tiO) - (A/Vi) (M-H) •

This equation must De part of a two equation system describing supply and
demand in the lanoe market,

13
= Ls

.LS

(~~"E)

Ld=Ld(w"S)
L=Ls=Ld

where R

~nd

S dre vectors of exogenous variables that may overlap and i

is

the actudl wage.
Then
1s !W,Hl =1d (W,S) =L

may be

so~ved

ior the actual wage"

W.

By fitting the resulting equation

over the members or the sample who have an observed non-zero wage we will
obtain estlwates of the expected wage for the employed 5

•

From this we can

see that our expected wage equation may be thought of as a reduced form from
a labor

su~p~y

dud demand system.

Having more rully characterized the expected and participation wages
the next task lS to discuss procedures for their estimation in tbe context
of the OL5 and CEM models.

5Actually, the appearance of the wage as a reciprocal in the labor supply
equation maKes solviny for the expected wage a little less casual than
descri be(l aJ.JOve.
Tilis non-linea r it y in the lailor supp 1 y eq'ua ti on prohibits
a linear form tur the expected wage as a reduced form of the simultaneous
system.
conse~uently, when choosing a linear (in the parameters) form for
the expected Wa48 one may prefer to think of the expected wage as a general
instrumental variab~es estimator for the system.
This does not imply that
Ballts proof ot unbLasedness in application of this estimator to the
expected wage for the employed justifies imputation of an expected wage to
the unem~~oyeQ DY retaining the coefficients from this procedure.
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C.
tue waqe

Est~mdtLnq

the

assumpt~on

emploYEd dnd

ESTIjATING THE WAGE EQUATIONS
e~uation

for the 015 model is straightforward since

taat the expected waqe is similarly determined for both

~s

Therefore it is sufficient to fit

ulLemp.~oyed.

thf~

observed

waqe for worKers to a linear combination of observed characteristics, then
take the coefflcients estimated and use them to find a tfltted f
nen-workers.

In this case a log-linear functional form was chosen with the

loq of tue waye on the left hand side.
literature,

This is the form predominant in the

litting percent chanqes instead of levels.

waqe equatLon were estimated.
with eight

waqe for

regressors~

Two versions of this

The first is a more detailed specification

Results of this fully specified wage equation are

reported in Appendlx II.

The equation used in tbe body of the work was

estimatei on a SUDset ot the regcessocs fcom the fully specifed equation
that wece cnosen according to their significance in the fully specified
model.

L~

was necessary to tcim down the wage equation for the 015 so that

the OLS expected waqe equation would be comparable to the CRj expected wage
eguat~on.

Cast In terms of ccmputer resources prohibited using the full

specificdtlon
rise

rap~aly

~n

tne CRM model.

Space and time requirements were found to

witn tDe number of parameters to be estimated in the

CRM~

!n

fact the model estllliated was the largest possible witn the technique used on
the 0 ber 1. ~n

Xerox S ig ma- 9 ope ra Ling system 6.

Col19'-,]8

The 0L5 model

~lso

has a more interesting interpretation than that of a

simple linear regression.
model of IdDor

tOLCS

It can h8 expressed in t8rms of a probabilistic

participation with a corresponding likelihood function.

Before tnis Lnterpretation can be given

~t

is helpful to derive the

likelihoud function for the CRH and detail the assumptions und.;3r which it is
60ther methods of estimation may have proven to be more efficient.
For a
more detdl~ed dlscussion of computer techniques, software available and
hardware resource constraints with regard to the mechanics of estimating the
CRM likeiinooa function see Appendix III.
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estimated.
Recall tne CHM model of wage determination
we=B1X:1

:to

u

tJp=B2X2 +

v

~

= We

~ff

We>Wp

=0 oUler wise.

Ordinary least squares is clearly not the appropriate estimating tecbnique
even for tne expected wage equation.

Because of the sample selection bias

which is ds;:;umed to exist in this model, u will he correlated with X1 when
We is closa to wp

~n

the non-censored sample.

When We, which is a function

of X1# is close to Wp, more of the observed wage distririution is truncated
than when it is fartber away_
affects

~

the erro r

out that in

term, will .be a fu nction of Xl.

Heckman (1 S 76) points

one cannot sign the direction of the bias introduced by

yenera~

this correLation.

consequently the level of truncation, which

Goldberger (1975) has shown that under certain conditions

one can ..l..dcln tif y tae sign of the bias if one also has

t

a pr iori' infor mation

about siqns of tue coefficients in the model's structural equations.
Ordinary least squares is impossible for the participation wage equation for
the simpLe reaSOD tnat there are no observations on the dependent variable.
However

WB

likelihood

may use the inequality determining participation to derive a
tunct~on

divide tue sample

incorporating all the information available.

~nto

two sub-samples, 51 containinq the unemployed and 52

containing the employed.
probabillty tor

~dch

Then in sample 51 we would like to maximize the

i that W(i)=O.

probability .for: eacti. i that

10)

(i)

In 52 we would like to maximize the

>Wp (i) <=>W (i) >0 and W{i) =We (i) =B 1X 1 {i) +u (i) "

In sample S 1 ,
PI:

(W=O) = Pr {We<Wp) =Pr (B lX 1+u<B2X2+v)

=
Now if

First

Pr!u-v<U2X2-BlX1).

16
)..

:.1"'1:4(OltJi)

!L

and

v"'N(O/O~)

then

Thus Ute

prui:.;dDil.l.tythat 14 (i) equals zero is gi ven bY

where F l.S the

~

,0, 1) cumulative distribution function.

In tue set 52 we wish to take advantage of the information that not

only is
Let

non-zero but it is observed and equal toWe,i).

'~11.}

G(u,v)=~'We-B1Xl,Wp-B2X2)

We are interested

be the bivariate normal

de~sitv

of u and v.

l.U

for i element of S2

AND W=We=B1Xl+u)

Pr,w=~e~Wp

= Er( v<W-i32X2 AND u=w-B1Xl).

(W-D2X2

~G(~-B1X1IV)dV.

The likell.nood function for the whole sample is found ov combining tbe
likelihoods LOL each sub-sample 'living

11

L (El,B;!, 0;,

'lYf
f~2X;;:B1Xy 1/

~

'5.1This is not

dil

COY (u,v) jXl,X2,W) =
vJ-I3;L'i-. J)....

G{W-B1X1.v)dv.

~'~
edSY iunction to evaluate.

that of zero COVarl.dnce.

One simp

Yl.o'l assumption is

In the case of zero covariance

cr

the likell.nood function of the second sub-sample factors because the
assumption

OL

zero covariance means that u and v are independent.

Then,
2r(w>Wp AND W=B1X1+u)=Pr(W>Wp)Pr(W=B1X1+u)
F I (W-B lX
\

0-;

1\ F (W-B21.:2\

J " cr~

}

and
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where P' is the Jeusity function corresponding to the distribution function
F.

Thus oue sample likelihood becomes

L (B 1, B2" 0;

I

Oil Xl, A 1.,

w)

=

"=!Tff(t>2X2-B1Xl\TJF~-B2X2\F' (W-B1Xl\
I / \ No;(J.+([~ /
\: o-~ J
\ cr; :.;
.51
This

simple~

,.f~

liKelihood function was the one employed in estimation of

81,82,0;- and O"'"J-.-.consequently some

covariance

~s

!1ldj ).

in order.

justification of the assumption of zero

If the model is correctly specified there is no

obvious reason why the errors of the participation and expected wage
~quations

should

~e

co~related.

For example, if uCi) is positive and we

have explained alL systematic variance in WeCi) then i
indi vid ua L

is simply a 'lucky'

There is no reason to think that luck in the labor market

should cause us to systematically under or overestimate a lucky individual's
particip~tioD

wage.

a negative u(i).
argue tha t a

A similar informal argument can be made for the case of

Likewise we can proceed from errors in the Wp equation and
error in the Wp equation would not allow one to predict

g~ven

the erroc in tae We equation.
covariance

a~lo~s

In addition, the assumption of zero

us to choose overlapping sets of regressors for the

particip aticn and ex pee ted wage equa tions wi t.nou t s:3.crifi cinq iden tif ication
of the par'ameters B2 (Nelson, 1974, p.19).
To see now tae ULS model may be characterized as a prubabilistic model
of employment Lt

LS

observatJ..ons on w ii)
OUI:

helpful to first consider the

C8M

model

D

with probability P eX) unemployed

with probability l-P ex) employed

where P (X) is yLVen as before, P (X)
P

we discard

and simply retain knowledge of employment status.

model says, .here Yei) is i ' s employment status;
'itL)=

~hen

(Q2~2~B '.X 1) •

=

Pr (weOip) =Pr

(\rl=O)

=

Then

18

The

like~Luoo~

tunction for this simplified version of the

CR~,

continuinq

to assume COVlu,V)=O is then 7
L (B1,b2, 0;, 0iIX1"X2) =

jI

1][ 1-F~2x2-B1x1\!

1
1l

1 lFfo,;:'(2-B1X1

~ N&."- facikI

JL
Now.

:'"-

~ Ncr"-t(T.,"-

<'

I

1

~

v

pictur~ug

the OLS model in a similar manner

~e

see that the model can

be descrlDed In terms of employment status as
y (J.) =

{~

wita probanility P unemployed

"
emp~oyed

with probability 1-P

where P is constant for all

J..

Then employment status in the OLS model is a

simple Dernoulli trial with fixed probability P,
is the

r2~~tlve

where N l S

Sci

51/[S1+S2)1 or more briefly nlN,

frequency of unemployment,

lfip .... 8 Slle and n is the

the best estimator of which

Ii umber

une mployed.

The liKelihood of

the sample In the OLS model is then
"
. n (1
. I"~')
i H/d}
. .- {n
l~

I N -l)

Incorporating the loformatioD on the observed waqe into the CLS
function
similarly

~llows

dS

likelihood

us to characterize the OLS aod CEM likelihood fUDctions as

pO~5i~le.

For the JIS model,

L(B1,6; ,n,NIX1,X2} =

1/([1 ). /1.1r' . ,(~-;2X 1)

:.5.1..
=

~i_

[1- (n/N) lP'

(n/Nln [ 1 - (n/N)

(1/0;)

I

t-'17F
Jd-.

t

(w- B 1X 1)
"0;

(1/0; ) •

)

7This function ~s a superficially appealing approach to estiillat~on of the
CRM because of its relative simplicity, especially if we are cnly interested
in the particlpat10n decision.
However, inspection shows the parameters to
be ideo
fled o~ly up to a scale factor of proportionality (rscall that
OJ c.nd CT"s... must. Le estimated). For more on the problems of indentification
in this clabs of models see Nelson (1974).
Somethinq Wt~ will do with this
likelihood L5 to plug in the parameter estimates from the full CEM
likelihood lD order to evaluate the likelihood of employment status alone
without lDcluding data on the observed wage for the employed.
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Ideally we

WOUl.d

lil'u:;: to ne aDle to compare the

the aid uL a L0cmal hypothesis test.

CRi"l and

the 01S models with

The most appealing approach would be

to consider the OL5 model as a constrained subset of the CRM model, with
corLespoHd~lL';

null uypothesis that 01S is true aqainst the alternative

hypothesls that the CRM is true.
likelihood [atlo statistic.

The test statistic would then be the

Therefore it is necessary to ask;

model in fact a SUDset of the

CRM

model?

is the OLS

It turns out that it is not.

Consider the relevant probability measures in the CBM model
Pr(w=O)=

F(B2X2-B1X~
\: IY(,
• /o-0l1

c-~
~

and

Pr{W)O AND W=We)= Pr{W>Wp AND W=We)

=F (W-;;~~2) Ft ~-~x y(1/0;)
and in tile CLS model
Pr nJ=O}:::;

Pr (14.,>0

(n/N)

Al~D

W=We)

= [1- {n/N} 1Ft ~-~X1) (i/o;}.

Letting ulN te equal to the constant probaoility P we see that for 01S to be
a const,rd.l.ned

3UD3et.

of the CRr1 t,here mu,st exist

SOfUt:3

Pdr:a!l1et.{~r:s

E 1$ 32;

a; , a;

such thd.t
r

a.ll i

anu
l-P for all i.

RemembecLnq that X1 and X2 are large matrices of dimension nUilloer of
coeffic

nts by numDer of observations it becomes apparent that the first

equality

wi~~

De true only for 81=0 and B2=0 for all Bls in 81 and B2.

B2 is 0 then the seGond equality requires that W
the

3GCOiid

If

constant for all i since

equal.l.t¥ deqenerates to F {W/O""",d equalinq a constant 1-P and o.i is

20

constant tor all i.

Consequently, at least for the time being, it is

necessary to look tor some informal means of comparison between the 015 and
the CRM models.

Siace the two models were estimated separately for racial

groups taesa tests are more informative than one might think.

Consider the

hypothesis that ior blacks unemployment is random and for whites
unemploYillent is voluntary and given by the CRM decision rule, i.e., those
who are not working have chosen to do so because their expected waqe fails
to exceed their participation wage.
following

stat~st~cs

were computed for each racial qroup and informal

comparisons were made"
wage

equat~ons,

To examine tbis hypothesis the

These statistics are th.e mean squared error of the

goodness of fit of the CBM functional probabilities to the

OLS constant pronaoility and the simplified log likelihood for employment

status at 8st1mdted parameter values.

A fourth statistic for goodness of

fit of tae CRM is8
Z=

~ it (i) -P (X) }ji: {P (X) r 1-P (I) »
I
VN' f

where Y(L)LS lor 0 for its employment status.
If we knew the true parameter vectors this statistic would be dis·tributed
NCO,1).

rio we Vf.;:L we onl y have estimates for B 1, B2 O'i and c.r;.. of which PCX) is

a function.

Because of this a fairly complex correction to this statistic

is required usilig tne variance-covariance matrix of the estimated parameter
values.

For reasons of time and diminishing marginal returns this test is

set aside for tuture work 9 •

The statistic for goodness of fit of the CBM

proLabilities ot unemployment to the constant OLS probability of
""Vdunemployment is constructed like a ~ statistic, however it is not

SNote that the notation PCX) is a fUDction of each characteristic vector
Xii) and is mednt to imply PCX!i») ..
9Actually this stat~stic was computed without the correction for estimates
of the parameters.
For the record the results are reported in the next
section.
The value of this statistic for both white dnd blaCK is out in the
tail of the distr~butioD.
It is likely however that introduction of the
correction wou~d bring the values closer to the center of the distribution.
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distr ibut ed '1/02-.
I'-

The formula used here is

LU

P [X)-P]c2.;P} = Q.

/
The mean

squ~red

~ [y

error of the OLS model is given by
{l.) - p

since E[ Y(i) 1= P

]..tIN

I

where Y (1) lS

elli~loyment

status.

For the CRL'l model tue mean squared error: is gi ven DV

2: [y eii -

P eX}

]~ IN

since E[Y{i) 1=

P (X) "

I

Often two mean squared errors may be compared formally with an F-test on
their ratio as eaca is distributed

'1/0>~

•

However, as before with the

likelihoou rat10 test, in this case we run into the problem of identifying
the hypothesis to De tested.

Because the OLS model

model an F-test LS Lnappropriate.

1S

not nested in the CRS

A possible solution to this problem is

the estimation of a "supermodel" in which both the CRM and OLS models are
nested, if such a model exists.

Another approach that may bear fruit in the

future is the derivation of the distribution of the likelihoods for the two
models so tnat their difference or ratio may be compared.

The last method

used here to evaluate the two models in terms of their relative performance
across rdcLal groups is the calculation of log likelihoods for the
probability of employment status from the two models.
this requ1red

ca~cu~ation

For the CIS model

of

Loq L(n,NJ= nLogen/Ii)

+ (N-n)Log[1-(n/N)

1

and for the CRM,
Log L (El, b2, (j"

O"""o"lJX 1,X2)=

L. Log
..f1.

E' (B2X2- B1X
'\ .AI0;-..2. ... O"";C

9-t- LLOg[ l-f~~X2-B1Xy 1
S :J-.

IVOJ..2 ... oi-

at estimated parameter values.
Results ior these procedures along with coefficient estimates for the OL5

22
and CRM models are reported in tbe next section.
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D.

RESULTS OF THE ESTIMATIONS

Before descr1Ding the results a discussion of the data is in order.
The sample is a. subset of the National Longitudinal survey data

011

men aged

45-59 in 1966, tor wbom observations on the wage were available or wbo were
listed as unemployed by Current Population Survey definition.

The sample

excluded ruen who never worked, men paid by piece rate, men self-employed and
volunteer

~orKers.

This selection process also removed a number of

unexplained missinq sample points and reduced the uncensored sample size of
5020 to 3705.

Of tue 1315 missing observations, about 430 are missing

because their labor force status did not describe them as eligible for an
hourly wage dnd 8d5 are missing because of other factors in the selection
process as described above.

Estimation of the model further reduced the

sample S1ze, dS cases were removed for which one or more variables wa.s
missing.

The f1nal sample size was 2429 white and

1076 black for a grand

total ot 3505.

Tbe mean and median wages for the employed members of this

hardy group are

<.j~ven

GROUP MEAN

below:

MEDIAN

white 3.51 3. 12
black 2.22 2. 10 (black and 'other')
Total 3. 12 2.84

Except in the case of the fully specified waqe equation discussed in
Appendix II the sample was furtber reduced by random samplinq so that the
core space c€Quirements for the program that estimated the CRM would not be
unmanageabLe ( see Appendix III ).

The final estimations of the C8M and the

OLS were done on two samples, one of 847 Whites, 36 of whom were unemployed,
and one at 846 blacks, 29 of whom were unemployed.

Sampling weights were

introduced into the likelihood functions so that they would estimate in the
context of the correct ratio of unemployed to employed.

Likewise, any time

24
the

relat~v€

freguency of unemployment was calculated it was done on the

basis of the relative

freq~ncy

in the uncensored sample.

The results for the expected wage equation are presented in Table 1
below 10

•

On tue following page

correspond~ng

the
last

statist~cs

CRM

~stimdtion

Ta~le

2 presents the results of the

of the participation wage.

for comaprison of the CRM and OLS models described in the

sect~on.

lONota tUdt

Table 3 contains

coek£Lc~ents

are of the form LOGlB).

Table 1

EXPECTED WAGE tJUATION FOR WHITES:

OLS

CEM

variable

C08ificient T-statistic

Coefficient T-statisic

CONSTANT

5. 1 e:)

HEALTH

O. b20

5. 177

3.85

160 .• 59

0.1618

12.23

(some eft '2ct-)ao effect on work)

-0.00b46

-1. 73

-0.00058

- 5. 22

EDUCA.TION

O.OSS1

11.75

0.05617

37.70

AREA. RES

- O. Oj4 5

-6.06

-0"OJ717

-18.60

0.01273

23.84

(45->S9)

(urtan-):curaJ.)
JOB TENLlEr:;

0.01267

f-STATISTIC= 66.4B
R-SQlJAR.!-:D=

.29

STU ERROR REG=.44

ESTIMATED M.S.E.=3~685
MAXIrllJi'i .LIKELIliOOD ES'IIi'1l,TE
OF STD ERROR OF REG= .4384

(T-statistic=160.59)

EXPECTED WAGE EQUATION FOR BLACKS;
CONSTANT

5.837

HE1UTH

-0.00347

-0.09

-0.2856

AGE:

-v.Ol08

-3.03

-0.00687

E DUCliTIOd

0.02728

6.77

0.01601+

AREA FES

-0.0845

-14.40

0.01136

7 .• 28

6. 101

F-STATISTIC= 91.95
[(- [JARED= .36
STJ ERROR REG=.41

-0.0840
0.01022

39. 17

-10.62

-2.58
5.833

-20.88

9.97

ESTIMATED ~.S.E.=1.892
MAXIM:Hl LIKELIHCDD ESTH1ATE
OF STD ERROR OF REG=.4075
(T-statistic=73.69)
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Talll e 2
PARTICIPATION WAGE EQUATION FOR WHITES
variable

Coefficient T-statistic

CONSTAN T

2. 182

1.08

MAR.STAT.

-0.0555

-0.109

(1=married,2=not mar-ried)
NO.DEP'S

-0.00254

-0.0296

0.00221

1. 19

(dependen ts)
TRANSFERS

(food stamps, unemployment compensation, welfare and public assis.)
ASSETS

-0.000055

-0.00841

(Family and Business)
EDUCATION

0.02616

0.58500

ESTIclATED M.S.E.=3.685
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE
OF STD ERROR OF REG=1.31 IT-statistic=1.27)
PARTICIPlI. TIO N WAGE EQUATION FOR BLACKS
CONSTANT

-8.264

-0.48

MAR.STAT

0.8962

NO.DEP'S

-0.00168

-0.114

'I'RANSFERS

0.0009

0.763

ASSETS

0.00402

0.0785

EDUCATION

-0.1033

0.634

-0.609

ESTIMATED 8.S.E.=1.892

LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE
OF STD ERROR OF REG= 5.0 {converqed at a

~AXIMUM

boundary,~=.78}
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Table 3 11

WHITE
OLS

STATISTIC
1)

GOODNESS OF FIT

(OLS
for

witl~

BLACK
CRM

OLS

113. 7

CRM

15.7

CRt'!

prob~bil~t~es)

.0414

.0376

.0331

.03377

-186.2

-155.6

-132.7

-152.7

(for: probdililities;

3) LOG LIK ELHWOD

,of

probaDll~ties)

4)LCG LIKELlhOOD

-1534.0

-787.0

6.4

11.8

(from fUl.l CaL"l)
5)UNCOBRECTED NORMAL

'rEST (CRM only)

Regardless of the hypothesis about how the eBM results should compare
with the OLS results there is no getting around the fact that the estimates
of the

part~cipation

wage are not very good.

No doubt this is partly a

result of the CRM estimdting procedure which is very sensitive to parameters
used in toe numerical algorithm such as increment halving dnd boundary
constraints.

In dddition choice of initial values was very important.

The

initial values procedure used here was cumbersome, involving preliminary OLS
and Probit est,l.lnation in the manner sUggested by Nelson (1974).
detailed discussion of this procedure see Appendix III.

For a more

Another factor

contributing to tne high standard errors of the coeffcient estimates in the

llThere are a lot of mean squared errors floating about and it is important
to distinguish them.
The estimated M.S.E.
of tables 1 and 2 is computed by
the CRM re4ress~ou program and is the estimated M.S.E.
of the entire eBM
system.
Also in Tacies 1 and 2 the values given as maximum likelihood
estimates of standard error of the regression are the estimated parameters,
cr, and 00.., one ior each equation. The mean squared errors in table 3 arafor
differences in actual and expected probabilities of unemployment predicted
by the two models.
Tbey are given by the formulas shown earlier.
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participatloB wage equatioo is simply the meager information available on
The CRM had no trouble estimating the expected

which to Dase an estimation»

wage witn a hign degree of confidence.
Ins~ection

of the results in terms of the original hypothesis shows the

evidence to Le mlxed.

The signs of the coefficients on the expected waqe

equation do not change between
wn~tes

However. ior

CR~

and OLS estimation for either

race~

the magnitude of the coefficients for the CRM aod OLS

estimation at tae expected wage is much closer than it is for

blacks~

This

might inu1caLe tnat samfle selection is more important for blacks than for
whites, contrary to the original hypothesis that black unemployment is
randomly

dra~n

~nile

white unemployment is voluntary.

This difference in

maqnitude is fa1rly weak evidence especially when one considers the fact
that the

q~eatGst

d~fferences

in 01S and CRM estimates for blaCKS are found

tor those coeiiiclent estimates in which the least confidence is warranted.
These are tue

hed~th

and age coefficients.

The black 015 health coefficient

is negative dnd tnls clearly is a nonsensical result since the health
variable ranged tram

1= some health effect to

2=no health effect cn work.

The T-statistic for this estimate is almost zero and the sign in this case
can

be

large

attr~Luteu

sam~le

to sampling errOL.

In Appendix I I the fully specified

mOdel produced a positive health coefficient for Dlacks, though

again it 15 not

5~qnificantly

the

remains negative in the CRM estimation ahd tbe level of

coeft~clent

sign

ance

the model

~s

~ncreases

different from zero.

dramatically.

mis-specified.

There is no denying that

This suggests another explanation, that

The other main difference between 01S ::ind CRt1

estimation of tue expected wage equation for blacks is in the age and
education coeLticieuts.

The signs don't change but the

somewhat smallec 1D absolute value.

CR~

estimates are

In both models the age coefficient

estimates are less significant than the other regressors except for some
health

coeitic~ent

estimates.

29

The

neqat~ve

slgn on age for both races in both models is an

interestinq result.

It was robust under a number of 015 specifications.

seems that WhdLBver returns to age there are for hourly
from

incre~sEd

wa~e

It

earners come

lob tenure, and that once this variable is added aqe is free

to show ltd tLue effects.

Variations in specification desiqned to test this

result are discussed in Appendix II.

The remaining estimates for tbe

expected wage equations seem to make sense in both the CRM and OL5 models.

The overaLL f:dttern in the coefficients point up some interesting
1I",,~~.e

differences

l.D

DlacK and white

~

determination.

While education and iob

tenure are slgnitlcant positive factors for both races they are less so for
blacks, where type of area of residence is the drivinq factor.
part1.Cipatlon wage estimates in Table 2 ace ver:y :lifficult to

ThE;:

interpret and a nUillDer of stories may De told about them.
and whltes the

Pd~tLcipation

For both Dlacks

wage is low relative to the expected waqe.

fact there aLe no samrle points,

In

unemployed or otherwise, for whom the eR!

was successtul in i1.tting the log of the participation waqe above the log of
the expected wage.
whom wp >

~e.

This does not necessarily imply that there is no one for

To determine the fitted ie and Wp values req

res more than

taking toe exponential of log values because of tbe bias introduced by the
ncn-linearitv or tne logarithmic transformation.
complex i see N8yman and Scott,

1960)

The correction is slightly

and requires estimates of 0; and

~to

get correct811 '2st.1.illates even d.t the means of the independent variables.
~oss~£.1.e

was not

to get any 1:e1iao1e corrected estimates of black

participation and expected wages because the estimate of
boundary

It

coostra~nt

CT.;t

converqed to a

and it is therefore unlikely that the estimate is very

close to the true value.
k

nUillDer of variations io the numerical algorithm parameters were tried

for both [aces to evaluate the sensitivity of the results to these factors.
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The white

~esults

were not very sensitive to these variation3.

However, in

the blaci\. participation wage equation It was found that either the ffa.. term
always cOHverg'3d to tile positive maximum boundary or the constant term
always converged to the negative minimum boundary.

This suggests the

interestuq l.nterp:cetation that for blacks the participati:)n waqe is
vi[-tually zero.

If the participation wage is zero for blacks the constant

term should converge to a very negative number as the wage tries to reach
the constant is free to go as low as l.t wants tben the

~f

Llkewise

zero.

error of the equation could be expected to converge at its maximum since the
wage can only reaca zero in the logarithmic transfo:cmation wben tbe
determinlng

var~aDles

belps explain tae
participdt~on

~ow

reach negative infinity.

T-ratios for the coefficients in the black

waqe eguation.

the coefLlcients

dLe

This interpretation also

zero.

ie cannot reject the hypothesis that all of
The zero participaticn wage explanation also

helps explain the counter-intuitive result that for blaci\s more education
decreases the
constant

part~cipation

4ou~d

The

If the true coeffecients are zero and the

infinitely negative if we let it then the siqns on the

De

estimated coatI

wage.

ients are

Pdrarnete~

mea~ingless.

estimates for the white participation equation suggest

that the wlllte partlcipation wage may be positive, but there is no
conclusive evidence either
coafi

The constant is positive and alonq with the

nt on tLallsfer income is the most significant determinant of

participatlun
do not

way~

encoura~e

the betteL

Like the equation for Dlacks the T-ratios are low and

wa~es.

confidence in the estimates.

estima~e

of

~

"'-

An encouraginq difference is

for whites than for blacks.

Thouqh not

statistically siqaificant, the results for whites are somewhat better
overall tnan for blacks in the participation wage.

The m03t disturbing

result for wnite participation wages is the negative coefficient on assets.
However the f-ratlo for this estimate is the worst of all the estimates aDd
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is

virtual~y

zero.

Gnce again the evidence is weak, but it seems to suggest

that if the partLc1pation wage is significant for anyone it is significant
for whites.

If tne participation wage is indeed relevant for

VI

hites and

irrelevant for ulacks then the hypothesiS that white unemployment is more a
vol~ntdry

product at

Turn1n~

decisions than black has received some support.

to the comparative statistics of Table J a definite pattern

presents itselt.

The first statistic indicates that the fit of estimated

pro.tabili ties from the CR M to the OLS rela ti ve freq uencies is mu cll better
for blaCKS.

Interpretation of this result is highly pronlematic;

black CRct results close to the 'true' OLS results or vice versa?

are the
with

regard to the mean squared errors of the probabilities from the two models
the expected inequality holds.

For whites the CRt'! did a better ;ob of

predictinq employment status than did the OLS model.

For olacks the

opposite i3 true, the 01S has a lower mean sguared error than the CRM.

The

loq likelinoods for employment status are consistent with the first two
results.

For whites CRM predictions of employment status are more 'likely'

then the OLS pred1ctions and for blacks the opposite is true.

However, the

likelihood of the full CR!:'l is higher for blacks than it is for whites.

One

explanat10n fOL this is the better overall fit of the black expected wage
equation wiuch appears in the CRM.

It is also possible for the CRM to do a

better ioo of expLaining wages for blacks than for whites and still do a
worse

iOD

relat1ve to the OLS model.

That is, the CRM is a better explainer

for blaCKS tnaD for whites but the OLS is a better explainer for blacks than
-F IF t-It
the CRM.
The fo~rth statistic is the uncorrected normal test of the CRM.
For both races the statistic's values are high enough to reiect the CRM,
however the reiection is stronger for blacks than for whites.

Introduction

of the correction for parameter estimates mentioned in footnote nine would
probably br1llg both races' statistic value closer to the center of the
distribution w1thout chanqing their relationship to each other.

32

These results

a~e

admittedly inconclusive.

what evidence "there is supports a case
unemployment in 1966
likely foe blacks.

~as

fo~

Nonetheless it seems that

the notion that white adult

a product of deliberate decision while this is less

Conversely, i t seems

mo~e

likely that black unemployment

was a ran do ill, in vol Ull tary phenomenon than i t does for whi tes.
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E.

CCNCLUSIOHS AND FUTURE WORK

Although it is not entirely satisfactory, the procedure proposed bere
for

chardcteriz~llg

approach.

unemployment appears to be an interesting and useful

some wedK evidence has been given for differences in the nature

of unempLoyment across races.

clearly, more work is necessary before

anything can be said with confidence.
regression

mode~

The econometrics of the censored

are complex and cumbersome.

In order to improve this

situation some worK has been done on simpler estima tors for this class of
models.

See, tor example, Heckman

(1976)

wherein a simplified estimator is

proposed that allows estimation by least squares and Probit analysis.
recent revLsion and clarification of this article is HeCkman
a two-stage

est~mdtor

(1979)

A

wherein

is applied to the problem.

In HeCKman (1976) a censored variable estimation is performed for wbite
married women.

Heckman compares his estimator with the maximum likelihood

and OL5 estimators.
groups.

He does not, however investiqate a breakdown by racial

HeckmdD £1979) points out that while his results do not allow

reiection of tbe null hypothesis that sample selection is an unimportant
phenomenon Gronau (1974) found significant selectivity bias.

Both Gronau

and Heckman concentrate on selectivity bias as an econometric missing
variable or

spec~tication

problem and not as a tool for understanding the

type of unemployment Observed.

Heckmanfs estimates of the samp1!3 likelihood

for the hypotnesis of sample selection and the hypothesis of no sample
selection are almost identica1 12 •
suffers

d~scrimination

If one considers women to be a group that

this tends to support the notion that for groups for

whom unemployment is an involuntary phenomenon the OL5 will do at least as
good a

iOD

of predLcting employment status as the censored regression model.

12The 1i~elihood for the hypothesis of sample selection is -5,778 and for
the hypothesis of no sample selection is -5,783 ( Heckman, 1976, Table 3).
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An

~mportant

contribution to the type of study undertaken here would be

the development at statistics enabling one to compare apples and oranges
like the OLS and censored regression model in a rigorous and meaningful way.
To this end two suggestions are offered.

A useful approach may be the

development of a distribution theory for the likelihood equations generated
by this type ot comparison.

Their individual distriDutions should qive rise

to a distribution useful for the construction of hypothesis tests on their
differences.

Another valuable contribution would be the identification of a

more general model in which both the CaM and OLS are nested.

A number of interesting modifications should be made to the economic
foundations of the model.

One of the most interestinq would be the

introauction of time preference and search behavior.

In this caSES the CRM

might de.3criDe tue unemployed as making decisions based on the diffecence
between the present value of the expected waqe and the present value of the
participdtion wage.

()Ve.II"

.,.,"""t..
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APPENDIX 1: Tne Expected Wage as Instrumental Variables Estimator.
Hall's procedure for imputing a wage to the unemployed and removing the
bias from measurement error begins by considering a simple labor supply
function.

exam~le,

For

1

=

Bo + B1W + u

where W is the actaal wage for agent i
term.

and u is the iTH stochastic error

In many cross-section studies the observed waqediffers from the true

wage by some random measurement error:

w
~TH

where w is the
assume that v

~s

= W+

observed wage and v is the error of measurement.

uncorrelated with i

errors in measuring the wage.
former

v

,

We

i.e., that there are no systematic

Substituting the latter equation into the

g~ves

L = Bo

= Bo

+ Blw + u -

B1v because

+ Blw + e where e

=u

w=

w- v

- Bl'

which is what we would estimate without correcting for measurement error.

v is positive in w = W + v

The problem of measurement bias arises because
and negative in e

=

u - Blv causing wand e to be negatively correlated,

violating one ot the classical assumptions that errors are uncorrelated with
regressors.

Th~s

negative correlation will bias B1 downwards,

underestiffidting tne labor supply response to the waqe (Hall,1973).

However,

this proulem as well as the problem of a lack of observations on the wage
rate for the unemployed may be resolved in one procedure by addinq an
iDstrumenta~

varLaoles estimator to the labor supply equation, where the

instrumeuts are the (exogenous)

determinants of the wage rate.

determination equation says that the
chaLacter~~tics,

error term,

f.

~served

The wage

wage is a function of personal

a random disturbance for measurement error, v and a second
The resulting wage eguation is

W = Ao + A111 + ••••••••• AnXn + p

+ v
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= w' ... p + v

where X

=

X1, ••••• ,In is a vector of observed personal characteristics.

Applying OLSU to

th~s

equation yields an equation that will provide an

imputed Wd'1e:

w' = Ao'+Al'I1 +

~

••••••

+

An'Xn

where the A' s are estimated coefficients.
From the two equations
L - Bo ... Blw + u -

S1v and

w

=

w' ... p + v

L

=

Bo + B1f w' ... p + v

we get

= Bo ... B 1[

=

Bo ... B lv I

z

= Blp

] ... u -

B1v

w' + p ) + u
Z

...

where
... u.

Estimation ot the last labor supply equation,
L= Bo + B 1iii'

by OLSQ LS

a~propriate

+

Z

if the imputed wage is used for all observations in

the sample 13 and will provide consistent and unbiased estimates of the
parameters of the labor supply equation

(Hall,1973, pp.

1 10- 1 1 1) •

the Lmputed wage were to be used only for those without an observed
wage and the ouserved wage for those with an observed waqe, then the
appropriate estimator would be weighted least squares, with less weight on
those sample po~nts using the imputed wage because VAR!z) > VAR (u).
131i
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APPENDIX II: The Fully Specified Expected Wage Equation.
The following model was estimated for each racial group:

lnW=AX1+BX2+CX3+DX4+EX5+FX6+GX7+HX8+e
where

Xl=1
=2

HEALTH limits amount or kind of work
HEALTH has no effect on work

X2=AGE

45-59

X3=EDIJCation

years,

X4=SKILL

content of current or most

1-18

recent 10b by traininq time required
X5=RESinJency

by population density

X6=HCAN

Duncan index of socioeconomic prestiqe
for current or most recent 10b

X7=TENURE

at current or most recent job

X8=UN E~ PLOY meat

rate in respondent·s labor market.

The results tor this regression are reported separately for black and white
below:
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CA)

FOR WHITES, WOl: king o.r

if i

th a iob not worki nq by CPS def ini tioRS
F-statistic=197.5

Dependent Variable=Ln{hourly wage}

R-squared= • .36
Std.
VARIABLE

COEFFICIENT

STD. ERROR COEF

HEALTH

.. 09

.02

18. 1

AGE

! -. 07)

.002

10.5

EDUC

• 03

.003

67.0

SKILL

.05

.006

55.0

RES

(-.03)

.003

63. 1

RCU1

.. 005

.0005

97.6

TENURE

.008

.0008

101 • .3

UNEM

.002

.0004

35.2

The regression

~s

ErrOl: Reqr.=.42

F-statistics

highly significant overall and all coe£ficients are

significantly different from zero at any reasonable level of significance.
The results for blacks had a similar basic pattern:
(B)

FOR BLACKS, same labor force qroup as in above table
Dependent Variable=Ln[hrlywage)

F-statistic=97.0
R-squared=.]9
Std. Error Reqr= .. 40
F-statistic

VAlUABLE

COEFFICI ENT

STD. ERROR COEF

HEALTH

.04

.03

1. 7

AGE

(-.01)

.003

14.0

EDUC

.015

.004

16.0

SKILL

.OJ

.009

9.3

RES

(-.09)

.005

288.7

RCAN

.004

.001

10.0

TENURE

.009

.001

51.9

UNEM

.002

.0006

16.2

39

In this set of

req~essions

there are a number of interesting results.

Education is hi.ghly significant but certainly not the most significant
determinant of wages, especially in the case of black workers.
seem that the most
1966 was

res~dency

~mportant

It would

factor in the determination of black wages in

by population density.

Another interesting result is the

siqnificance of the tenure variable in both reqressions.

A surprising

result is the sign of the coefficient on the unemployment variable whic4 has
a robustly positive sign under all variations in regressors and functional
form tried.

This suggests the counter-intuitive conclusion that the higher

the unemployment rate in the respondent's labor market, the bigher a wage he
could expect.

One explanation for this is a leftward shift in supply in the

high unem}:loyrue.nt areas, in which case some observed unemployment must be
voluntary.

Another explanation is the negative zero-order correlation

between population density and unemployment

(-.12), that is, as population

density decreased, unemployment fell, therefore high unemployment is
correlated with high population density which is correlated with high wages
and the two variables, UHEM and RES are picking up some of the same

eff~cts.

Retention of UNEI:1 in the regression and removal of the population density
variable, RES

ra~ses

the significance of t.ne coefficient on

the idea that these two variables proxy some of the same

UMEM,

effects~

supporting
There

were some proolems with multi-collinearity, though nothing severe enough to
warrant re-specification.

The highest zero-order correlations between

dependent variabBs vere around .67, between the skill and the Duncan index
variable.

This is admittedly high, but the Duncan index for current or most

recent job dnd the skill variable probably pick up a lot of the variation in
wages that are not captured by education or job tenure.

The introduction of

variables for fatherfs education or Duncan index when the respondent was 15
produced no significant result.s, not surprising for this age qroup at this
time.

Perhaps the most interesting result from this procedure is the
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significdntly

neqdt~ve

coefficient on age.

but not usually until around age

60~

other studies have found this,

This result was robust under all

specifica tions at tern p ted including the in troduct ion of an interaction term
for age and tenure,

AGE*TENURE.

However, the interaction term estimation

was uninformative Decause it was 99% collinear with the tenure variable.
There is an interesting result that sheds a little light on the negative age
cae ffic ie nt.
correlated

Removal of the tenure variable, which was zero-order

w~tb

age between .1-.2, resulted in the sign of tbe aqe

coefficient remaining negative, out becoming insignificant.
tbat whatever

pos~t1ve

This indicates

effects age has on wages over this range is 1arg,11

because of the correlation of age with job tenure.

When tenure is

introduced into tDe analysis, it takes on a significantly positive
coefficiellt and dllows the effect of age to show shows its true colors 14 •
To wrap up this d1Scussion zero-order correlations for the dependent
variaLle wLtb

al~

tue independent variables dre reported below:

In!"laqe}

HEALTH

AGE

EDUC

SKIl,l

RES

White

• }4

-.07

.43

.44

-.24

.51

Black

.05

-.1 1

.36

.27

- . 52

.34

In (w aqe)

TENUHE

UNEM

DADCAN (Duncan index fdther's 1ob)

White

.24

• 12

.25

Black

.26

.09

.08

RC.AN

For the most part these results are consistant with the reqression resu1ts f
particularly wLtn respect to Black/White differences.

14This lase discussion applies only to the white results, the coefficient on
age for DLacks remains negative and significant DO matter what is done.
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APPENDIX III: Technical Issues in Estimation
a.

Programming the Censored Regression Model
The censored regression model was estimated by an adaptation of the

BMDP (1917)

proprietary software subrogram PAB for derivative free

non-linedr regression.

Ordinarily the PAB program will estimdte a

non-linear equation specified in a user written FORTRAN SUbroutine, tbe
format of whica LS given in the BMDP manual.

Users of IBM operating systems

may specify the location of the subroutine in system job control language.
For XEROX users ll.ke Oberlin College it is necessary to mod.ify the source
code of the PAR program directly, inserting the user written subroutine as
an internal SUbroutine to be compiled with the rest of the program.
addition,

In

if it is necessary to introduce sampling weights into the

likelihood function (as opposed to the data) because of biased sampling (in
this case the unemployed were oversampled) an additional labelled COMMON
block. should be created containing the weights.

The main program may then

pass this l.nformation to the subroutine without cumbersome, CPU time
consuming read statements.
squares using

d

PAR generates parameter estimates by least

psuedo Gauss-Newton. algorithm.

To adapt the program to do

maximum likelinood estimation the least squares criteria for convergence may
be turned off and replaced with a user supplied loss function in the FORTRAN
su broutiDe.

'l'ne loss f uucti on, in this case - 2 times the log 1 ik. elihood ,

will be ID1D1mized at

converqence~

(See pp.

4'99-513 in BMDP-77d There is

an alternative method mentioned in the manual that is somewhat less
t,ransparent.
Users of

smal~

and medium sized operating systems may expect to

encounter several difficulties with the use of PARior maximum likelihood
estimation witb cross-section data.

The PAR program loads all the data into

core memory and 1ts core requirements rise rapidly with the number of
parameters to be estimated.

For the CRM estimated bere there were twelve
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parameters.
could only

It WaS found that the regular sized PAR program of 15,000 words
est~mate

that many parameters for about 200 cases.

With the

program workspace increased to 55,000 words and a number of program overlays
requ~red

the total core
Oberlin XEROX

S~qma-9.

became 72,000 words, the maximum usable core on the
At this size the program was capable of estimating

twelve parameters for about 900 cases.
of maximum

~~kelibood

BMDP-77 manual.

The BHDP P3R program is also capable

estimation by the methods described above and in tbe

It is more space efficient but requires that the user

sUPFly partial derivatives for all parameters in the FORTRAN subroutine.
The PAR program is slow, requiring about 60 minutes of

CPU

time for each 100

iterations.
The advantage of using the PAR program is that little complex
programming is required of the user.

An alternative, relatively labor

intensive approach is a user written main program manipulating the
Newton-Hapneson m1nimization and matrix inversion subroutines from the
FOBTHAN scientific subroutine Package 15 •

This approach is probably more

efficient in terms of computer resource consumption as the programmer need
not instruct his
Consumption of

ma~n

CPU

program to store the data in core during execution.

time would probably qo up with this method because of

additional input aud output tasks..

In addition, more pcoqramminq is

reguiced for this approach than with the adaptation of relatively complete,
user- friendly proprietary software.
A number at parameters affecting ·the numerical alqorithm in PAR ma y be
modified by the user.

.For the CRM estima tes done here boundary constraints

were imposed on all coefficients of (-10,+10)
standard

dev~ations,

OJ

and

0.. of

(0,5).

and constants of

[-20,+20) and

The only estimation to converge

15The evaluation of the normal density and distribution in the FORTRAN
likelihood fUDction subroutine was done using the FORTRAN Scienti£ic
Subroutine Package subroutine NDTR in double precision arithmetic.
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at a boun dar y point was the bliie k
equation.

Some possible reasons for this boundary convergence are qiven in

the body of the paper.
inc~ement

Another user controlled parameter is the number of

halvings aetween iterations in the search for a minimum of the

loss function.
that

o;i term in the partici pa tion wage

The

increas~ng

program defaults to a maximum of five.

It was found

the maximum number of increment halvings would sometimes

reduce the number of iterations required for convergence.

Var iat ions in

increment nalvings and boundary consteaints did not have milch

,~fiect

on

coefficient estimaces tut did effect the standard errors of the estimates to
some degree.

For blacks the reported estimates were chosen on the basis of

the lowest loss function for which the constant in the participation waqe
equation did not converge to a boundary.

! The equation with a slightly

lower loss function wberein the participation wage constant term did
converge to boundary gave a constant of -201)

For whites no parameter

estimates converged at boundary points and different estimations qave very
sirru.lar results.

b.

Init~ai

VaLues Procedure

Good LnLtLai values were very important.
follows that suggested by Nelson
1.

(1974).

The procedure used here

The steps dre descrioed below:

EstLUdc.e the expected wage equation for tlu2 employed by ordinary least

sgual'€s.

2.

Reta~n

the coefficients from step 1 and impute a fitted

wage to all

members of the sample, including the unemployed.

3.

Using toe

f~tted

wage as the observed wage = expected wage,

analysis to estimate the probability that ie>Wp=B2X2+v.
p. S 17 8)

pro v ides a mo re deta iled ex plana tion

0

f

Gronau

(1973,

tlw ap plica tion of Probi t

this ty pe of ti.rE:::SllOld F['ob lem and the in te eprata han of Prohi t
coefficie nts.

appl Y Pro hi t

to
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Nelson

{1974)

points out tha t the Probit likelihood function is

actually a spec1dl case of the CBM likelihood function when the COV(u#v) is
zero and tile expected wage is observed for the entire sample.

Pr(W=O)=Pr(We(Wp)=Pr(v(B2X2-We)

= F ~2x1:we)

.

and
Pr(w>O)=Pr(We>~p)=1-Pr(v<B2X2-We)

= 1-F(B2~;-W;
qi vinq sample lik.elihood

ilaere Y (.L)

loS

€IlP..!.o1I11e1l

L(82,o-a...IY,We,X2)=

UP ~2Xj.;W~ 7J
-.51

H

~2Xj.;:lj") J

'..S ~

which is the Probit .likelihood function.

t sta. tus

i

Then,
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